[I]dentity cannot be managed in isolation. Other identities are necessarily involved.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

Metapattern does not provide a positive, complete definition of object. A […] definition exists for what an object is within a context. Further, the number of possible contexts is infinite. By implication, an overall object may appear in any number of identities.

in: Metapattern as context orientation: meeting Odell's challenge of object orientation

 

My proposal for making an ontology of interdependency as consistent as possible is to add a radical assumption. An object behaves in different situations, yet I still want to — be able to — consider it as some whole, too. So, what entails the necessary and sufficient condition for connecting an object’s situated behaviors? It should be ‘something’ that re-appears across situations. As the name suggests, I have developed a concept of identity to connect situational behaviors for interdependency.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

A rational design for identity management would start from its systemic nature[.]

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

In an ontology of interdependency the concept of identity is both situationally and behaviorally indeterminate. For (only) its radical minimalism makes it optimally suitable for supporting interdependency.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

Identity itself is even radically changed into a pivot, only. It should function unhampered as a hinge between situation and behavior.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

The inverse relationship between scope and precision in meaning is formally acknowledged by Metapattern through the concept of nil identity, i.e. behaviorless behavior. It allows for variable scoping.

in: note 23.19

 

An interdependent identity is characterized by, say, a singular emptiness in support of the multiple fullness of its object. As far as such separation of concerns is … concerned, it might be compared to a hinge which allows, by pretending to be neither in any way, a door not to be a wall, vice versa.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

[T]he concept of identity (an arbitrarily chosen link, only) has changed into more or less the opposite of what it means in an ontology of independency (equivalent with object).

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

The requisite variety at the scale of open interdependency is facilitated by radically reduced identities serving to differentiate between situational behaviors for objects, yet allowing for their integration. Identity and difference(s) are thus reconciled.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

An actor, or agent, is assumed to reside in various situations. Hence variety exists in the actor’s behavior. In fact, a particular behavior completely corresponds with the actor as far as a particular situation goes. Adding situation and behavior therefore turns inside-out the treatment of an actor as entity/object. Only an actor y’s barest identity remains necessary and sufficient for relating a situation x and a behavior z. The whole of actor y is now reflected by his particular behaviors across relevant situations.

in: The Relationship between Metapattern in Knowledge Management as a Conceptual Model and Contragrammar as Conceptual Meaning

 

Radical decomposition suggests an object’s identity emerges from differences, i.e. consists of relationships with different objects. Likewise, every such different object also exists as an emerging identity. Identities mutually determine each other[.]

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

More and more interactions will be electronically mediated. At least technically, a single infrastructure, or a network of infrastructures, will be available to carry the information traffic. Metapattern allows for conceptual integration through interdependent identifications.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

[T]he radical context orientation changes the meaning of object identity. Actually, nodes provide an overall object with separate identities; that is, with one identity for every context. In terms of [its] diverse behaviors, therefore, the overall object […] is modeled as consisting of partial identities, exactly equaling in number [its] behavioral variety.

in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection

 

The radical conclusion from the orientation at situational behavior is that an object's identification is behaviorally meaningless.

in: Metapattern: information modeling as enneadic dynamics

 

Again, an identity serves to preserve an object’s sameness across situations and its corresponding behavioral differences. […]Obviously, when an object's existence in the past, present and future is no longer considered relevant in any (other) situation, its otherwise empty identity is also no longer required.

in: Metapattern: information modeling as enneadic dynamics

 

Identity, and therefore identification, turns out to consist of a dynamic structure of differences.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

We really have to find a way to deal with multiplicity by balancing differences with identity. My departure is that there is no longer any object as a wholesome construct (or logical atom) from which a behavioral part may be isolated (say, by masking all other parts) as a context requires. Rather, I aim at different contextual parts. Then, it certainly is still possible to provide an overview of the parts constituting an object. However, such an overview is behaviorally meaningless because, by definition, behavior resides in separate contextual parts. What the concept of object safeguards — and why it cannot be discarded, at all — is identity between different behaviors. Please note that I don't mean an identity in the sense of equality or even similarity (of behaviors). It is more like a continuity, a denominator.

in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 1

 

[H]ardly recognized yet is the need to strike a social balance between identity and difference.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

It should be possible to make evolutionary sense of the success from tangling identities.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

Communication and identity management are largely synonymous; identity management is essentially dialogical.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

[S]ome partial identity of one object (y) may serve as another object’s (x) nil identity. With k for node, applying the symbolic language used in Metapattern, that is:
k_x,0 = k_y,n.
The boundary for cascading nil nodes is of course established by the so-called nil object with its corresponding (nil) identity, aka horizon.

in: Cascading nil nodes in Metapattern

 

For unambiguous modeling of behavior, On is differentiated into situated objects. Each situated object, let’s call it o(n,s), is uniquely identified. For coordination, all such situated identities refer to an overall identity, [or nil identitiy,] securing that each of an object’s situated behaviors can be accessed from any other of its situated behaviors.

in: Get into the rhythm of Metapattern

 

The original assumption that an object’s nil identity as a separate node should always be directly linked to the horizon is actually too strict. For some situated object, any other situated object may be taken as providing it with a nil identity, albeit of a relative nature.

in: Get into the rhythm of Metapattern

 

[T]he practice was adopted for actual models, whenever a misunderstanding seems unlikely to occur, to conflate nil identity with a situated object that could be considered most ‘primitive’ within the horizon. [… I]t follows that in modeling practice, given the right assumptions, all situated objects are differentiated from other situated objects, i.e. objects resulting from earlier differentiation.

in: Get into the rhythm of Metapattern

 

We may, and invariably will, interpret an object from different perspectives (also read: motives). Yet, when we also believe — in a pragmatic sense — that different, necessarily perspectival, interpretations pertain to the same object, what those perspectives structurally have in common is an overall identity for ‘their’ object.

in: Perspectivism in federated practice

 

What has been gained in precision grounded on discontinuity between relevant situations requires a different concept of object. What does the continuity entail for arguing that behaviorally different situated objects do in some other sense ‘belong’ together? By definition it cannot be yet another situated object, for that would only lead to an infinite regression. And an unsituated object may not be regularly admitted. Assuming a boundary value, with its inherent irrationality, is in order. […] Metapattern’s radical solution recognizes that only a behaviorally empty object can serve the cohesive purpose. Its artificially attributed property is strictly limited to a nil-identity. A situated object should include a reference to a nil-identity. When different situated objects have as one of their properties the same reference, they are considered the complementary parts of the “same object.”

in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling

 

With no other behavior overlapping, there’s never absolute certainty about different situated objects ‘belonging’ together. In fact, the concept of an object’s nil-identity suggests how easily a situated object may change the attribution of its alliance. With a different reference to an equally valid nil-identity, a situated object moves form one ‘family’ of situated objects to another.

in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling

 

It is this phenomenal individuality which makes separating 1. situation from situated object and 2. situated object form behavior, respectively, a matter of arbitrary choice.

in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling

 

It is probably easier to ‘first’ recognize the contextualistic mechanism when explained along the dimension of (f)act. One and the same object may exhibit a variety of behaviors. In the ennead as (meta)model several axiomatic relationships are contained. One is that an object’s particular behavior is always associated with an equally particular situation[. …] It may then be assumed that an object exists as a set of situated object-parts, with only a behaviorally empty overall-identity for cohesion (allowing for ‘movement’ from — behavior by — one situated part-object to — that by — another of the same overall object) .

in: Invitation to contextualism

 

There are reciprocal, and I believe basically dynamic, relationships between enneadic dimensions and their respective elements. One and the same signature may be used in (also read: together with) different contexts. For economy, it is the total effort of staging context plus producing signature that counts, not just of a single sign, but between signs. And it is not merely some original effort by the sign producer that enters weighs in; probably more important, even, is the rate of compliance with — relevant — sign consumers that it helps to induce.

in: Invitation to contextualism

 

An object exhibits differential behavior. A particular behavior always occurs relative to some situation. It is taken as axiomatic that when an object’s behaviors are different, it performs them in different situations. Equally axiomatic, non- or asituational behavior does not exist. Yet, for a variety of situational behaviors to be attributed to one and the same object, for an object to change behavior from one situation to the next, et cetera, there must also be cohesion. It follows that identity must be assumed non- or abehaviorally. […] I have called what connects an object’s situationally partial objects exhibiting pertinent situational behaviors its nil-identity.

in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on

 

I acknowledge that my concept of nil-identity closely resembles Kripke’s rigid designator. So, I agree with Kripke about a [— proper [— name merely facilitating reference. What I don’t get, though, is all the excitement. I’m afraid it says more about logicians’ isolation than mark a genuine breakthrough. Didn’t Ferdinand de Saussure already clearly mention that a sign is arbitrary regarding meaning? Shakespeare has Juliet desperately hoping for a future with Romeo, exclaiming “What’s in a name?”

in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on

 

[W]hatever confusion about denotation and connotation simply dissolves enneadically. For meaning — depending on the semiotic dimension taken for explanation — is inherently situational, contextual and motivated. […] Holding such differences together, and facilitating changing from one motivated concept to another, et cetera, requires what I’ve called formally a nil-identity (as part of Metapattern, a method for modelling based on recursive situational/contextual differentiation). So, there it is, a so-called empty signifier.

in: note 56.8

 

I wouldn’t be surprised when you think that I have gone mad. Have I completely lost sight of your actual problems? […] What I am trying to capture is some general characterization of social dynamics. My idea is that ‘something happens’ which is then provided which the status of consolidation by making a record of it, i.e., a document. In the ‘form’ of a document, that is, as something static, dynamics 1. come to a momentary halt and 2. are thereby given a hold for continuation (while limiting the need for backtracking when what ’happens next’ goes wrong by securing an audit trail).
Such, say, alteration facilitates order when the scope of interactions extends beyond ‘familiar’ contacts. It therefore exemplifies the transition from prehistory to history. So, nothing new, really. It certainly doesn’t change with the availability of digital technologies. However, such technologies do greatly accelerate event-document dynamics. Regretfully, we remain largely confused about their optimal use as long as we fail to miss the principle for historical order in our society. It is this principle that we have to properly grasp, first of all. […]
Traditionally, that is, with paper-based documentation and the likes, the document was the only record of the event. It therefore had to contain a description of all — what count as — relevant involvements. This changes when one and the same ‘medium’ is used both to — partly — facilitate the actual event and to provide a document about it. Much of the latter is then ‘in fact’ already supplied by the former. Still from a traditional archival perspective, the former is labeled metainformation (more popularly known as: metadata). As the set of relevant information acquired during the operational phase of the event increases and (!) remains accessible to properly authorized actors (more about actors soon), what the ‘document’ — still — needs to cover diminishes correspondingly. Another way of putting this is that a reference is sufficient under the denominator of document; its contents are distributed but may be grouped on demand through their relationships.

in: note 71.28