Metapattern > interdisciplinary foundations > logic of interdependence
A logic rules interdependency, too, but it is a new logic. The old logic of independency, that is, of ontological atomism, is insufficient to explain it. Hence the requirement for a paradigm shift.
in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management
In the semiotic ennead, formal correspondences rule between dimensions.
in: Semiotics of identity management
The open scope for behavior including inquiry, necessary for responsibly living in our modern network society, is shown to correspond with radicalizing Aristotles’ precondition for syllogism’s validity.
Ontology is not independent from logic. I rather hold that a particular logic is by definition the expression of a particular ontology.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
[A]n ontology such as subjective situationism is required for handling variety in information management. [… We should] regard […] subjective situationism as a behavior-oriented logical atomism. It is therefore a logic, too.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
The semiotic ennead/Metapattern helps […] balancing relativism. For what a person takes as a particular situation, all that’s inside appears with an absolute value. Please note that the scope of such positivism is limited. On the other hand, what is relative pertains to switching from one situation to another.
in: On "nil" modality and Metapattern
Metapattern/semiotic (dia-)ennead offers a framework for helping to explain principles applied more implicitly elsewhere. And, now given such an explicit method/tool, order may be established in an even more rigorous fashion. For you can rely on an experience-relevant formalism.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 2
Diachronically, […] a concept such as identity […] maintain[s] continuity despite differences […]. While […] classical philosophy has tended to concentrate on a synchronic concept of identity (where it establishes a tautology)[, i]t turns out that identity, too, means different 'things' in correspondingly different contexts.
in: On metapattern and other themes in information management
As modelers/designers, we need to realize that abstract and concrete have become treacherous ideas. For it all depends on scope/scale. […] What has to operate at a large scale (broader perspective), may seem abstract when viewed from a much smaller scale (narrower perspective). But, in fact, everything must be exhaustively concrete at its relevant scale (from its relevant perspective), period. Otherwise, it simply doesn’t … work.
in: Perspectivism in federated practice
Behaviors can be explained as regular when they can be attributed to — an object behaving in — different situations. What appears contradictory, and therefore remains baffling, when a so-called independent object is required to produce behavioral variety, simply dissolves into complementary behaviors of different situated objects. In other words, real differences are a matter of metaphysical acceptance, et cetera.
in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling
And then complementarity has this special quality. It defies all claims and expectations of complementary behaviors being explainable in a way that is overall “logically consistent.” For if that were possible, such behaviors would not need to be — taken as — complementary.
in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling
Remember that it is discontinuity which makes impossible consistent, exhaustive explanation as behavior(s) of an independently existing object. It is the very problem that made Bohr think of complementarity as a solution. [… T]aken as different phenomena, […] discontinuity has simply dissolved. And without that burden, classical concepts apply, albeit limited to a particular phenomenon. In fact, explaining complementary behaviors has logically become far more simple; conditions have been moved to the situation in question, leaving behavior of the situated object to be explained strictly in positive terms.
in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling
Starting out from the opposite end — which is only productively possible after having unrooted and aligned organicism, mechanism and formism — it is not a matter of truth in an absolute sense that can be claimed for the semiotic ennead (mechanism) and Metapattern (formism). What counts is pragmatic consistency. How far is variety explained? How optimally is behavior varied between situations? Whatever improvements should be of primary interest?
in: Invitation to contextualism
It affords to consider one and the same sign(ature) multicontextually, corresponding to consider one and the same object multisituationally. Let me proceed — trying to explain the comprehensiveness claim of contextualism/situationism — along the ennead’s dimension of (f)act, that is, involving the triplet of situation, object, and behavior. The object may be taken to exhibit behavior in any situation. Situations may be — interpreted as — changed, added, deleted, whatever. There is no end to interpretation.
in: note 53.13
Already differentiating between relevant situations for an object’s behaviors in one and the same world makes the distinction between actual and possible worlds unnecessary. For possibility may be taken to exist in the [— actual [— world, too.
in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on
I don’t see any other necessity, and of course this one is contingent upon the axioms that have been set. Other necessities are derivative.
in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on
Differentiating between situations to the extent that behaviors can be unequivocally attributed shifts much of traditional logic. For myself, after having drawn up a well-differentiated model, by which I mean the stage at which an object’s behaviors are situated as disjunct for which Metapattern may be applied for modeling, I don’t see relevance of [— other [— formal logic.
in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on
With digital technologies supporting human interaction, it should come as no surprise that modeling requires the turn to applied social psychology (and actually adding a rigorously situational logic to it).
in: note 56.5
When you require a formal logic to meet, say, flexibility of identity, indeed, Metapattern is a serious contender. […] Of course, with currently predominant logics, identity somehow even contradicts flexibility[. …] Shifting the emphasis for identification to particular(ized) behavior, the question is what makes behavior … particular, i.e., specific, unique. I assume it is where and when object and situation meet (with both object and situation appearing as relative concepts, allowing for recursion). From this assumption of linking particular behavior with identity, and with an object’s so-called nil identity taken for its nonbehavioral base (or, as I believe you might say, core), adaptive, emergent or whatever different behavior simply entails yet another situational identity, and so on. For any object (and, equally crucial, its nil identity to make Metapattern consistently work as a logic of interdependency), there is in principle no limit to adding situational identities: the space for emergence and adaptation is open(ed).
in: note 56.23
[D]ynamics of identity revolve around nil identity. [… O]n that basis a different logic has been launched.
in: note 56.24
With all relevant contexts made explicit, and a human modeler is indispensable for proper interpretation, ‘afterwards’ it ‘only’ becomes a matter of identifying the relevant context (rather than expect some ‘logic’ to perform the interpretation).
in: note 71.21
Integrated order requires a qualitatively different logic; a key (meta)concept is nil-identity for connecting an object’s contextual identities (each giving access to a positive description of that object’s behavior ‘within’ the corresponding situation) .
in: note 71.21
With contexts lacking, so-called artificial intelligence wouldn’t ‘know’ how to differentiate responsibly, while as soon as contexts are properly included no intelligence is artificially required. There is no replacing a good design(er) or, as you would probably say, a good analys(t).
in: note 71.25
[M]any people […] mistakenly believe that meanings are static and should be unambiguously related to unitary data. By implication they consider so-called formal logic as the paradigm case for programmed processing of ‘data,’ i.e., as if meanings don’t matter (which is clearly nonsense, but still not recognized as such).
in: note 71.40