[S]ocial psychology has long since recognized behavioral differentiation, with situation as the selective factor.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

Metapattern assumes that specific behavior is always determined by an object being in a situation. The same object in different situations will show different behaviors.

in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection

 

When suggesting examples from daily life, everybody easily becomes aware of how different situations correspond to equally different contexts to generate precision, i.e. to disambiguate.

in: note 23.1

 

Accepting the impossibility of isolating an object from situations and corresponding behaviors, it pays to look closely at the core assumption for interdependency: for an object, situation determines behavior.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

Active denial of subjectivity becomes a problem when real differences have a subjective (also read: individual) basis in interpretation.

in: Semiotics of identity management

 

Social psychologists have known for a long time that the overall behavior of a person is never completely consistent. Rather, consistency is limited to what is called—in Metapattern terms—a context. But this does not mean that modelers should apply the opposite idea and postulate as many different persons as there are relevant contexts. Overall, it is also still one indivisible person. Metapattern provides the balance between identity and difference, a balance which should be managed in open interconnection.

in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection

 

Metapattern suggests an actor invokes a particular behavior as befitting a particular situation. The patterns an actor is primarily recognizing are therefore: situations.

in: Metapattern for converging knowledge management with artificial intelligence

 

'[V]erstandhouding' is grounded on community. It is essentially social. It is about social relationships where participants use their mind (verstand) for enacting an attitude (houding) toward each other.

in: Mannoury's significs, or a philosophy of communal individualism

 

My view is radical in the sense that the dialectic process essentially occurs along phases of the individual, rather than between individual on the one hand and community on the other. Community is always constituted by individual behavior. Community, too, is the individual's experience of a possible situation. One such internal experience may lead to his subsequent external behavior, etcetera.

in: Mannoury's significs, or a philosophy of communal individualism

 

Calling upon yet another discipline, it is social psychology informing us that different behaviors of one and the same 'thing' are not necessarily consistent. On the face of 'things,' one behavior may even contradict another. The problem is resolved by introducing a differentiating variable, usually called situation.

in: What is an instance in information modeling?

 

What really does characterize an object is its behavior. In fact, given a particular situation, that behavior is the situational object.

in: Metapattern: information modeling as enneadic dynamics

 

Whereas ‘entity’ seems to suggest unification, only, I right away from basic assumptions include dynamics of identity and differentiation. So, whatever ‘entity’ is assumed, it may exhibit different behaviors. What counts as the 'logical atom' therefore shifts down to an entity's situated behavior.

in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 2

 

Variety for information management can […] encompass subjective differences, i.e. to be included into interdependency. It requires the shift of perspective where a subject is considered an object. The subject-as-situation allows to further differentiate between her, or his, motives, and so on.

in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management

 

An object behaves according to a particular situation; that is, its behavior can change from one situation to another. […] It is this behavioral variety, and the need to model it conceptually, which has resulted in the assignment of primacy to the situation rather than the object. […] Thus, primary attention shifts to what is around an object.

in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection

 

[A] person is not interacting with a separate motive and concept through focus. In the cognitive sense, s/he is constituted by that very interaction!

in: note 47.17

 

In the person acting as a so-called sign producer — I believe that — a transcendental correspondence is assumed aimed at eliciting behavior. Such is the purpose of a sign or, as a slogan, every sign is a request for compliance. […] Acting as a so-called sign observer, cognition (also read: semiosis) more or less ‘works’ in the opposite direction. Behavior is taken as a sign leading to a concept. It is only more or less, because the observer cannot help start from (specific) attention. In other words, s/he necessarily ‘enters’ the observation with a particular focus and thereby motive.

in: note 47.17

 

[R]egarding information the personal is not some reduction of the organizational. If anything, it is exactly the reverse. Fundamentally, there is only the personal, with the organizational ‘only’ a label for aggregation, for discognitization[. …] So, If you really want to get at the bottom of information, by all means stick to the (inter)personal.

in: note 47.17

 

It can now be recognized that with three categories, two interdependent arbitrary distinctions are involved, rather than one. Counterintuitive as it may be, this is not a problem at all. On the contrary, it allows for more precision in modeling, reducing ambiguity. What stands out in a situation as a situated object? And on the basis of that situated object, what counts as its behavior?

in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling

 

Extending complementarity to social-psychological phenomena, though, the number of complementary phenomena must instead be assumed infinite.

in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling

 

An object […] may be seen as a contextualistic machine, thereby cognitively being equipped as a … subject. No, we don’t master artificial intelligence to the extent that we can build organicistic copies. In fact, what — I hold that — contextualism teaches is that the concept of such copies is nonsense[.]

in: Invitation to contextualism

 

A situation evokes behavior, corresponding with motive and concept. Seen across the ennead, a concept is different because with a motive the situation is interpreted as different.

in: Invitation to contextualism

 

[T]here is always another situation, and so on. As we are ourselves in the process of making situations, too, there’s also no end to epistemic dynamics.

in: note 53.9

 

Axiomatically, I don’t see any difference between, especially, (social) psychology and philosophy. For it is ‘we’ who philosophize.

in: note 53.43

 

There’s advantage in behavioural flexibility, for which a subject has the ability to learn — and unlearn — motives … for distinguishing situations. Context, and sign (also read: language use) in general, supplies necessary and sufficient mediation.

in: note 56.7

 

Irreducible as it is, too, including motive in every sign occurrence simply amounts to every sign being a request for compliance. So, what counts beyond variety in signs (always including context) is variety in motives: subjective situationism.

in: note 56.7

 

Motive as one of the ennead’s elements points to what I take every sign to be, i.e., a request for compliance. I don’t see how any other interpretation — of sign, language, et cetera — makes evolutionary sense.

in: note 56.17

 

It is from Peirce that I have taken the idea that a change in interpretative state always (!) involves a factual/behavioral state with a sign-state mediating. And to make matters more ‘involved,’ how behavior is situationally differentiated through contextually differentiated sign(ature) is co-controlled from the interpretative state, i.e. motivated concept, to be changed by the ensuing cycle of enneadic dynamics. I find this (meta)model credible from the perspective of especially biology, including evolutionary psychology. Again, what is the state-changing algorithm? Appearing as sign, there is influence partly from outside. Most radically conceived, one focus changes completely at random to the next. Then, the algorithm counts as a random number generator, with the number(s) produced identifying both node and orientation for interpretative state.

in: note 56.24

 

What a subject considers being an object, is … motivated (and therefore always limited to a correspondingly situational appearance, i.e., phenomenon). This capacity must have developed because it offers evolutionary advantage, with motivational differentiation by an organism (also read: subject) ‘only’ serving its differential behaviors for increasing chances of survival.

in: note 56.27