Metapattern > interdisciplinary foundations > pragmatics
Variety is a characteristic of behavior. Metapattern is all about balancing variety of behaviors while maintaining an object's basic unity.
in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection
The immediate departure toward interdependency is to momentarily switch emphasis. […] This already is the decisive step, the behavioral turn in information management.
in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management
Situation takes its structural position/value. It gives operational meaning to what behavior is, vice versa. And as for its meaning, it irreducibly requires even all the ennead's elements and their relationships.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 2
Once you’re sensitive to meaningful annex behavioral differentiation, it‘s impossible not to recognize, even actively apply it all over.
in: note 23.1
What is actually learned is a system, not so much of labels, but of behavioral patterns for interaction.
in: Semiotics of identity management
Metapattern presumes that an object’s behaviors are completely different from one context to another. Odd as it may look, the absence of any shared properties by an object among its contexts exemplifies Metapattern.
in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection
[P]erspectival behaviorism definitely is a phenomenology. […] Behavioral perspective is an essentially pragmatist concept.
[The] semiotic ennead […] explicitly shows focus as the mechanism for punctuation. The ennead also implies the purpose of semiosis, i.e. the conduct of the individual's situated behavior.
in: Mannoury's significs, or a philosophy of communal individualism
My hypothesis is that signs and all they entail only make 'sense' under conditions where self-contained selection of behavior provides an evolutionary advantage.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 2
It follows that artificial intelligence is always artificial behavior, too.
in: Semiotic connectionism in artificial intelligence
An enneadic model of semiosis is […] applied to design a pragmatic, or behavioral, orientation at identity management.
in: Semiotics of identity management
Explaining it along the enneadic dimension of (f)act, what comes to be recognized as situation-object-behavior triplets reflect a subject’s, say, variety management.
in: Invitation to contextualism
The so-called golden mean might be conceived as some middle ground from which differentiations in all directions […] can emerge without unnecessary effort. Then, future differentiations may become more or less prone to occur dependent on previous occurrences.
in: Invitation to contextualism
[I]t is reasonable to assume […] that the result of a selection (scope) is determined for habitual acts by the availability of a ‘theory’ for acting with relevant precision. In principle, then, each purpose may carry its own theory, i.e. correspondingly local.
in: Contextualism means selectivity
Exemplary of contextualism’s selectivity is the enneadic element focus. Shifting focus stands for differential selectivity, a clear evolutionary advantage.
in: Contextualism means selectivity
Yes, of course, the axioms are — slightly — more elaborate. The subsequent gain in requisite variety, however, is huge. And we need it.
in: note 53.8
Digital technologies should only be instrumental, period. However, as such facilities used to be conceived, and still are, for that matter, real variety of human behaviors is not at all taken into account[.]
in: note 53.10
At this point I’d like to point out what I find to be a mistranslation of the title of Schopenhauer’s main work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. The German word Vorstellung is translated as representation. Schopenhauer would probably not have been happy with that, especially so because his command of the English language seems to have been excellent. The German prefix “vor” means pre. What he meant, therefore, is not re- but prepresentation, that is, a concept in preparation of behavior. And I find it clear that Schopenhauer considers such a concept inherently willed (he often uses the term interest, too), for which I use the term motive. You see that for the semiotic ennead I am not only indebted to Peirce, but to a large extent to Schopenhauer as well.
in: note 53.13
The question is what we are habitually being taught. It is simplistic to think of it as learning to associate names with things. Names serve a purpose. They appear as part of requests for compliance. A name can appear in a wide variety of contexts. With context corresponding to situation, as I have formalized in a semiotic ennead, in fact we never stop learning to vary behavior.
in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on
Learning to be a participating member of a language community is about sharing efficiency of language use. Why do you stop when some lights turn to, or are, red, while you don’t act at the sight of another red light? What is the difference? What is it for you, then and there?
in: Analytic philosophy for synthesis from early education on
The efficiency of behavior largely depends on motive — and therefore context and situation respectively — remaining implicit (also read: subconscious). We need to assume it, though, on the basis of differential behavior. Signs taken as atomic (also read: self-contained) fail to explain real variety.
in: note 56.4
An instance of behaviour is attributed to (also read: results from) the confluence (!) of subject and situation at some moment in time. Please note, what counts for the subject in question as situation is not objectively given, but already results from its cognition, or semiosis. Elaborating Peirce’s triad, with ground only vaguely attached by him, I’ve arrived at an enneadic model of semiosis — with recursion supporting hierarchies as required — including differentiated grounds as three of nine irreducible elements: situation, context, and motive. Such semiotics is suggestive of evolution … evolving, i.e., emphasizing cognitive plasticity of subject, and so on to its behavioural variety.
in: note 56.16
[M]y research priority lies with understanding how an object —
through evolution — supplied with cognitive powers, a subject,
for short, adapts to its environment (while, often, adapting the
environment to itself). With an enneadic (meta)model I propose that a
subject behaves situationally according to its motivated concept. Then,
how does a subject arrive from one motivated concept to the next, and
so on? I think still nobody really has a clue. And without thorough
understanding I find that what distinguishes, for example, artificial
intelligence is that it is highly artificial, i.e., extremely
nonintelligent.
Intelligence (here, also read: cognition) can, I find, only be
responsibly understood as a moment both from and toward behavior. I
took a cue from Peirce to assume mediation of signs, extending his
triadic model of “action of the sign” to enneadic dynamics.
Please note, it is a (meta)model of a subject. As such, it contributes
to designing proper tools for subjects. Indeed, Metapattern as a method
for modeling interdependent behaviors derives from it. However, what
makes ‘something cognitive’ come out as the next motivated
concept for situation-specific behavior, and so on, and so on, is still
very much a mystery. I believe to have merely pointed out a direction
where we might productively learn some more. And I hope that the closer
we arrive at equitable explanation, the less inclined we are to
engineer systems accordingly. I repeat, let us first behave responsibly
as subjects ourselves before engineering systems we are far from
understanding motivationally (grossly neglecting ethics in the
process).
in: note 56.19
My assumption is that self-concepts of a subject are equally motivated, including learning to be convinced of being an individual itself. Then, both intra- and intersubjective dynamics of — enneadic — semiosis follow the same (meta)pattern.
in: note 56.27
Of course, the ennead presumes subjects, too. A subject is ‘anyone’ who can — at least try to — adapt to its changing environment (with the environment changing in the process, and so on). Therefore, a subject behaves situationally, from — its experience of — situation to situation, with behaviour attributable to both subject and situation. From the perspective of the subject, situation should more in general be considered as ‘other.’
in: note 80.1