Metapattern > interdisciplinary foundations > ontology
Genuine philosophy is not for spectators, but for practitioners.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 2
Metapattern involves a different ontology. It is essentially dynamic. Rather than being, its critical concept is behaving.
in: Metapattern as situationist mereology
[T]he object's behavior in one context is different from its behavior in all other contexts. So, by placing the concept of context before that of object, the difference of Metapattern is of an ontological nature.
Metapattern's innovation is the radical importance attributed to the concept of context.
in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection
Any part, or whole, for that matter, is no longer treated as part-of-whole, but as object-in-situation. Then, the same object in a different situation unambiguously accounts for different behavior.
in: Metapattern as situationist mereology
It is impossible to separate modeling concerns from ontological and epistemological assumptions.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 1
Paradoxical as it may sound, a phenomenological inquiry inevitably starts in the middle. The paradox is even pervasive. Done properly, the middle, or center, is precisely where the inquiry develops at every step, right up to its conclusion.
I've attempted to optimize the conceptual economy of such an ontology by declaring situation, object and behavior all relative concepts. A particular situational object, i.e., that part of an object that is associated with a particular behavior, provides the perspective. From that perspective, behavior is constituted by objects in the sense of an explosion function. In the opposite direction, situation is a recursive function of objects.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
The limits […] are surpassed through a shift of ontological atom from object to behavior. Logical atomism thus transformed is characteristic of subjective situationism.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
[L]ogical atomism limits conceptual modeling and ensuing practical information management.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
A qualitative change in coordinating information variety evokes a corresponding metaphysics (which I will hold synonymous with ontology) that philosophers, I find, can ill afford to neglect: theory is relevant for practice.
[S]ituation is one among an irreducible set of relative concepts. It allows for recursiveness, thus covering a potentially infinite situational variety. So, there’s ample room to maneuver for interdependency.
in: Ontology for interdependency: steps to an ecology of information management
[A]n orientation for new directions, especially for information management, may resort to ontology, respectively metaphysics in their philosophical sense. […] My argument for especially raising a philosophical interest, though, is that the indeed highly practical infrastructural turn in information management appears to go straight at the heart of metaphysics.
Philosophy, science and, not to forget, religion may indeed be viewed as attempts for coming to terms with identity.
in: Semiotics of identity management
The Metapattern way of explaining the world denies the absolute existence of objects. Please note that objects are still believed to exist—very much so, in fact. It is their absolute existence which is removed as the one and only starting point for explaining the world. This is done for a practical purpose, for behavior is often, and increasingly so, diverse.
in: The pattern of metapattern: ontological formalization of context and time for open interconnection
[P]erspectival phenomenology, as I have labeled the […] constitutional unification [of phenomenology, pragmatism and semiotics], is indeed of special interest for information systems. With respect to information, essentially design always is behavioral design.
My point is that what they call "problems" may often not be a problem, at all. I mean to say that a thing behaving differently in different situations doesn't make that thing problematic. Behavioral differentiation might instead reflect the optimum in adaptation. An ontology […] should not foreclose situational differentiation but allow and even facilitate its modeling.
in: What is an instance in information modeling?
Again, struggling with the relationship between identity and difference is not a recent effort.
in: What is an instance in information modeling?
What led me to deconstruct 'object' as the ontological atom was the
insight that one and the same thing may nevertheless exhibit different
behaviors. This makes 'behavior' the ontological atom.
Concepts of object and behavior are still insufficient for an
unambiguous ontology. For the question remains what determines how an
object favors one behavior over other behaviors it is potentially
capable of. The answer lies in a third concept: situation. Atomic
behavior corresponds to a situationally determined 'part' of an object.
Again, the object [as a whole] is no longer atomic. Its [situationally
relevant] behaviors are now atomized.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
Jumping from object to behavior as the ontological atom might appear counterintuitive. The gain is the ambiguity absorbed by the concept of behavior. It resolves the paradox inherent in the assumption of a privileged thing-word complex. For in one sense, behavior is an object, too. But in another sense, it deconstructs an object. Behavior undermines the object's absolute existence. It challenges inseparable identity. The concept of behavior […] dictates that an object only exists through situations.
in: The ontological atom of behavior: toward a logic for information modeling beyond the classics
[I]t is precisely the traditional concept of logical atom that needs to be challenged — and modified — in order to open up modeling for supporting information processing of greater variety. […] Ontologically, we're getting stuck with the object as the logical atom. Rather, the logical atom is an object's situated, or contextual, behavior. And one object can exhibit various contextual behaviors.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 1
Let me elaborate on the difference between subject and object. Yes, on the surface the ennead takes it as an assumption. But then it counteracts/mitigates precisely that particular difference somewhat, at least that's what I find, by claiming […] behavior [is] essentially situated. So, it is not at all the subject acting against the object. In terms of behavior we have to acknowledge that it is impossible to separate the what that is behaving. It certainly is not the subject per se. Neither is it the object per se. That is, let's at least assume an interdependence.
in: Notes on Metapattern and enneadic semiosis, part 2
Suppose we could agree on different persons, or even the same person on different occasions (also read: situations), holding different concepts of ontology … that would already constitute an argument in favor of the interdependency paradigm.
in: note 23.4
The ennead merges ontology, epistemology and semiotics. Their
irreducibility rules.
Of course, we cannot escape emphasis, or focus, as one of the ennead's
nine elements is called. Despite some focus, interdependency
remains.
in: note 23.19
Behaviors and ‘their’ objects are interdependent, with situations mediating.
in: Metapattern as situationist mereology
[O]ntologically speaking Metapattern returns to an older tradition of singularity. Interconnection implies one world. Attempts at rational explanation should therefore start from a single ontology. Underlying Metapattern is an ontology merging transcendental realism as derived from Kant by Schopenhauer with Peirce’s semiotics, and adding Ashby’s concern for requisite variety. What results is what I’ve labeled subjective situationism.
in: Open conceptual modeling with Metapattern
[P]ostmodernism fundamentally is a misnomer. It is a cover up for people's laziness, i.e. keeping them from evaluating relevant variety.
in: note 47.6
Concentrating on assumptions is simply acknowledging that nobody can escape begging at least fundamental questions. That’s precisely what assumptions are for, that is, they should get you started for productive results and their ‘value’ is determined by how far they help you on your way.
in: note 47.16
As a point of quite general principle, first of all, assumptions by their nature do not lend themselves to becoming established by argument. Instead, the must be … assumed, which is why they cannot escape their largely irrational character. Precisely, what is meant here is irrational in the sense of not being susceptible to … argument.
in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling
It is crucial for understanding Bohr’s concept of complementarity that he does not equate phenomena with objects. In my words, an object comes secondary. It is a phenomenon that is observed. Only starting from such a phenomenon is it possible to distinguish between what counts as the instrument-of-observation and the object thus observed. And what ‘separates’ instrument and object is not, say, preordained, that is, with instrument and object each independently both contributing and responding to their interaction. Otherwise it would not be necessary to assume a phenomenon. […] Metapattern can in reverse be understood as a rearrangement, adding a third category. Rather than having a phenomenon envelop instrument and object, only to be distinguished after the envelope is opened, what exists ‘around’ is a situation. In Bohr’s case, that would be the complete set-up for observation and measurement. What gets interpreted at the other ‘end, ’ is a phenomenon in a narrower sense than Bohr’s. It is — therefore — better called behavior. Now, who or what is doing the behavior? There may believed to be(come) something in between situation and behavior: object. It is, however, not an object per se, but behavior is typically attributed to a situated object.
in: Metapattern for complementarity modeling
The semiotic ennead suggests in detail that “understanding cognition” is irreducibly linked not only to understanding behavior, but also to understanding language[, vice versa].
in: Invitation to contextualism
I associate the label of first order with (the) one: singular. Then, second order pertains to (the) many: plural. […] Here comes the departure. [C]ontextualism […] addresses the relationship between one and many.
in: Invitation to contextualism
There is singularity — only — in plurality, vice versa.
in: Invitation to contextualism
[M]otivationism (then, also read: purposivism) irreducibly implies situationism and contextualism — it is just a matter of the particular dimension chosen for emphasis[.]
in: Contextualism means selectivity
Rather than a world hypothesis, whatever theory is always a hypothesis for a particular purpose. Recognizing purposeful behavior, there is actually only a single world hypothesis required in the sense of aiming at a wider scope. All it needs to assume is dynamic variety in purposes. That is precisely what subjective situationism supplies, its axioms structurally exhibited by a (meta)model: semiotic ennead. So, there is metatheory to explain making the cut, and theory for proceeding ‘inside’ it. Such interchange may be repeated, which might then be labeled iteration. Or, one cut may lead to another, and so on, until there is scope for precision.
in: Contextualism means selectivity
The only theory of everything that I find is consistent with the assumption of “the purposive act” is that everything may be taken for theorizing. The gist of metatheory should not be so much that an act is purposive. Rather, it is that the actor may change purpose, thereby being able to perform a variety of acts, and learning in the process adding to variety of his purposes, and so on.
in: Contextualism means selectivity
[A]fter making a selection, you should not pretend you are still dealing with the whole world. Instead, you should then proceed on the basis of the particular selection, i.e. as if acting in just a specific part of the world. For that, continuing to apply a theory not geared towards that part is most likely even harmful. And one selection follows another, and so on.
in: Contextualism means selectivity
I would say that especially a so-called world theory should be limited to a metatheory, i.e. a general theory recursively allowing for, and in a sense generative of, several (more) specific theories. That is where contextualism displays it particular strength, taking context (corresponding with motive and situation) seriously. For a factual theory pertains to a particular situational object. i.e. some — type of — object behaving in some — type of — situation.
in: Contextualism means selectivity
A way of trying to avoid problems caused by logical atomism is
changing the meaning of ontology. As a strategy, it is habitually
applied subconsciously, making it near impossible to get people to
change such habit. Anyway, also for W3C (an) ontology is associated
with a particular domain. It may seem for a while, then, that variety
has vanished. For some domain is considered semantically fairly
homogeneous (which it is not, but W3C et cetera don’t realise it
yet). Anyway, what about exchange across domains? Variety rules.
Isn’t that what is typical for our information age?
To put it bluntly, making ontology to mean a single domain model is
nonsense, even counterproductive (making us spend time and money on
projects that can only fail). […] Where a.o. W3C stands on
ontology constitutes a genuinely paradigmatic gap. It can only be
closed by jumping (shift). Now, it is W3C et cetera who should do the
jumping. The ‘only’ problem is that it is not clear to them
that they should. On the contrary …
in: note 53.8
I believe that it is precisely why — and where — differentiating Peirce’s concept of ground yields productive assumptions, i.e. grounded theory as an unequivocal metatheory.
in: note 53.11
Please […] recognize the greatly increased explanatory power from enneadic — rather than triadic — semiotics. After all, moving from three to nine basic elements is a huge leap in potential for variety, nearly amounting to a paradigm shift. Or does it actually constitute one?
in: note 56.9
From just nine irreducibly linked elements, the ennead, plus the possibility of recursive relationships along each of its structurally corresponding dimensions/moments, an inexhaustible set of ‘variations on a theme’ can be developed (and reasonably explicitly expressed with Metapattern).
in: note 56.24
I’ve tried to accumulate necessary and sufficient axioms in a single schema to explain interdependency.
in: note 56.26
I reject being … being explained from levels. For resorting to levels of being raises the — at least to me obvious — question of how their interdependence ‘is.’ That question only becomes more unanswerable, I find, by adding yet another level, and so on; an infinite regress. When being is not taken as all-encompassing concept, then what is?
in: note 56.27
Any model necessarily falls — far — short of — the — being it attempts to present. A part cannot encompass a whole, period. The (meta)model of the semiotic ennead is certainly no exception. [… F]ollowing what I consider to be the maxim implied by Ockam’s razor, what I believe to be the semiotic ennead’s characteristic achievement, admittedly inadequate and, again, necessarily so, is precisely the stubbornly levelless attempt to address being comprehensively; it brings irreducibly irrational assumptions to the open in a single view (optimally allowing for criticism). Anyway, at least for some time it seems a sufficiently rich axiomatic schema for conceptual modeling for the practice of digital information systems engineering regardless of scope.
in: note 56.27
Please forget about essences, prototypes, core concepts, or whatever you want to pre-set as generally valid and allowing you to make inferences from. It is a dead end. Always has been, for that matter. For a limited scale you might still keep up the illusion that it works, but for an integrated order at any current, let alone future, scale it can only fail.
in: note 71.21
From such a predominant technological perspective, what people
wrongly consider as a conceptual model is called an ontology. From an
integrated-order perspective, though, ontologies in the plural are
simply nonsense.
Ontology in the singular should be taken as the set of basic
assumptions, only. You might call it a metamodel. Methodically applied,
it should now facilitate modeling real-world variety; traditional
atomism taken as such a metamodel/ontology is just not up to that task.
The assumptions explicitly underlying Metapattern therefore recognize
situational differentiation of object behavior.
in: note 71.39
However, I reject what Peirce suggests as typology of signs,
categories of Firstness et cetera, existential logic, and so on. In my
view, it all gets in the way of a most general semiotics. As practiced
academically, regretfully semiotics has become a predominantly sterile
discipline.
Yet, I do take a(nother) vital cue from Peirce for understanding
differences and their cohesion (also read: variety, interdependence). I
initially read his concept of ground in terms of Gestalt psychology,
that is, as a background always appearing in concert with a foreground
figure. […] It appeared odd to me that that Peirce doesn’t
seem to — continue to — bother much about what he names
ground. I begged to differ, also because previously I had developed a
formal method, Metapattern, for modelling behavioural variety based on
recursion of — what I then called — context. I subsequently
recognized how ground could productively be applied to all of
Peirce’s original triadic elements, that is, differentiated
accordingly, thus raising the number of such irreducible elements from
three for a triad to six for a hexad. But, then, I had already equipped
the sign structure according to Metapattern with three — mutually
relative because of recursion; I myself had added a mediating element
for flexibility — elements. For arriving at (also read:
engineering :-) necessary and sufficient structural correspondence, I
extended — what in the hexad had already changed from elements to
moments/dimensions with each two elements — both object and
interpretant to three elements, too.
in: note 80.1
Peirce emphasizes again and again that for an understanding of semiosis the elements of his triadic schema should be taken as, I repeat, irreducibly related. Of course, this ‘rule’ also holds for the semiotic ennead. And compared with Peirce’s triad plus ground, the ennead with its additional elements makes it easier to recognize how signs including (!) context mediate between motivated concepts and situated behaviours; context, situation and motive jointly act in dia-enneadic dynamics (also read: dialogism) as the triadically differentiated concepts as derived from what I understood as Peirce’s as yet undifferentiated concept of ground.
in: note 80.1
The scheme I took my departure from is Charles Peirce’s. I
have maintained his ‘original’ three elements as what I
subsequently call dimensions, or moments, with each dimension now
counting three elements (making nine element all together, aka ennead).
[…]
What the ennead allows, and I find Peirce has to be applauded for
inspiring such connections, is comprehensively ordering —
scientific — disciplines. For you may recognize that efforts
according to traditional disciplines are habitually concentrated each
on one of the three enneadic dimensions. Then, the ennead lets you
hypothesize how such different disciplines may be related, too.
Meanwhile, pursuing any such discipline more or less on its own, the
enneadic dimension which it may be assumed that underlies it, suggests
a set of three, say, metaconcepts. For anything to do with data,
information, or whatever it is called, the obvious orientation follows
the sign dimension, containing the related elements of context,
signature and intext. The scope they cover is open, because they are
assumed to be relative. For example, bank. Take the word as a
signature. By itself, it is not clear what it means. As, formally
called, sufficient and necessary ‘information’ must be
added for disambiguation. That is covered by what according to the
ennead’s sign dimension is the element called context. Is it a
bank as a financial establishment? Or the side of a river? With
everything considered relative, in turn — the word —
financial establishment may require to be taken as a signature, et
cetera. The metaconcept intext covers what completes the unambiguous
overall sign as a pertinent description (with parts of intext, when
considered necessary, taken as signatures, et cetera). […]
In terms of the ennead, Metapattern […] includes context in
descriptions. What context is supposed to describe or, rather as Peirce
productively assumes and what the ennead helps to make more explicit,
mediates are situation along one of the other two dimensions and motive
along the other of the other two dimensions.
in: note 80.3
I’d rather like to consider the enneadic framework an useful,
even long overdue, extension of Peirce’s triadic one of
semiosis.
I came up with the idea while pondering on his qualification, a
qualification Aristotle, among others, already suggested as necessary
to account for relevant variety, for that matter, with Peirce
emphasizing that “a sign is something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect or capacity.†That is, in
his words, too, “a sign stands for [an] object, not in all
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes
called the ground of the [sign].†Uncertain of where to
place “ground,†though, I took a trusted
engineer’s approach and supplied each and every one of
Peirce’s three elements with ‘its’ ground, thus
arriving at six elements. When you don’t want to miss, just hit
everything. The result might be surprisingly effective, which in this
case I certainly found, and continue to find, it to be. For
Peirce’s original three elements had become three, say,
dimensions with each dimension counting two elements. Next, as an
engineer I had also recognized the exponential advantages from what
Peirce introduces as a third element, i.e., sign explicitly mediating
(also read: acting as hinge) between elements of, and thereby
overcoming limitations from lack of flexibility, a merely dualistic
framework. Indeed, another decade earlier I had developed a formal
method for conceptual modelling, Metapattern, based on what from
subsequently studying Peirce’s semiotics I could place as the
mediating element on the sign dimension. More or less repeating the
procedure, I continued to supply both other ‘dimensions’
each with such a mediating element, too. From Peirce’s triad and
including — as a fourth element? — his reference to ground,
a framework consisting of nine irreducible — the term […]
is also Peirce’s — originated, hence called an ennead.
[…] No doubt, you’ll readily recognize Peirce’s triad
‘at the centre.’
in: note 80.4
One of my claims is that the ennead facilitates interdisciplinary explanations. If so, I venture to add that it should be of some philosophical interest, and from there support many practical interests becoming more realistically integrated. If pragmatics is not about … practice, what is?
in: note 80.4